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Members of  stigmatized groups are generally 
aware of  their group’s low-status position in 
society and of  the negative stereotypes associ-
ated with their group (e.g., Crocker, Major, & 
Steele, 1998; Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 
2000; Swim & Stangor, 1998). It is therefore not 
surprising that members of  stigmatized groups 
are concerned about how they are evaluated by 
interaction partners from high-status groups 
(Vorauer, 2006), develop expectations of  preju-
diced treatment (Pinel, 1999; Vorauer, Main, & 
O’Connell, 1998; cf. Downey & Feldman, 1996), 
and frequently avoid interactions across group 
boundaries altogether (Shelton & Richeson, 
2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1985).
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Abstract
Prejudice expectations and other interpersonal rejection concerns have been found to direct attention 
towards social evaluative information. In some studies, rejection concerns have been found to direct 
attention towards social acceptance cues, whereas other studies have found an attention bias towards 
social rejection cues. In the present article we argue that these attention biases constitute promotion- 
(vs. prevention-) oriented strategies to deal with concerns about how one is evaluated. In support of  
this notion, a first study demonstrated that prejudice expectations direct attention towards male faces 
signaling happiness (vs. contempt) among women with a chronic promotion focus, but not among 
women with a chronic prevention focus. A second study demonstrated that the effect generalizes to 
subliminally presented acceptance-related (vs. nonsocial, sexist) words, and when a promotion (vs. 
prevention) focus had been experimentally induced. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
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When interactions across group boundaries do 
occur however, research suggests that expectations 
of  prejudiced treatment can shape stigmatized 
individuals information processing and behavior 
in two diametrically different directions. On the 
one hand, prejudice expectations can contribute to 
self-fulfilling prophecies by causing stigmatized 
individuals to interpret ambiguous behaviors and 
facial expressions of  their interaction partner as 
signs of  prejudice (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; 
Inzlicht, Kaiser, & Major, 2008), and by negatively 
affecting how stigmatized individuals themselves 
behave towards members of  the outgroup (Pinel, 
2002; cf. Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 
1998). On the other hand, prejudice expectations 
have also been found to make stigmatized individ-
uals more involved during interactions across 
group boundaries and to lead them to engage in 
compensatory prosocial behaviors in order to 
make the interactions more pleasant (e.g., Shelton, 
2003; Shelton, Richeson, & Salvatore, 2005). 
Notably, compensatory efforts stemming from 
prejudice expectations can have a positive effect 
not only on how their partners experience the 
interaction (Shelton et al., 2005), but on the experi-
ences stigmatized individuals have as well (Shelton, 
2003; but see Shelton et al., 2005).
Recent evidence from research on selective 
attention suggests that each of  these responses to 
prejudice expectations—vigilance for signs of  
prejudice as well as attempts to affiliate with the 
interaction partner—can operate preconsciously. 
For example, one set of  studies demonstrated 
that prejudice expectations can cause the individ-
ual to selectively attend to subliminal prejudice 
cues (Kaiser, Vick, & Major, 2006). By contrast, 
evidence from the broader literature on social 
rejection concerns suggests that individuals who 
are concerned about interpersonal rejection 
selectively attend to faces signaling social accept-
ance (e.g., DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009; cf. 
Rothermund, Voss, & Wentura, 2008).
In the present research we investigate whether 
these disparate responses can be understood as 
distinct self-regulatory strategies in situations in 
which concerns about rejection are salient. We will 
argue that, when a stigmatized individual is in a 
promotion-oriented regulatory state, prejudice 
expectations initiate compensatory attempts to 
facilitate the interaction, manifested in a selective 
search for signs of  social acceptance. By contrast, 
when the individual is in a prevention-oriented 
regulatory state, prejudice expectations are expected 
to initiate a vigilant search for signs of  social rejec-
tion. Below we briefly review the literature on 
responses to prejudice expectations and other 
forms of  interpersonal rejection concerns, focus-
ing on the consequences for selective attention. 
After that we outline why the individual’s regula-
tory focus (Higgins, 1997) should determine the 
particular strategy adopted in response to preju-
dice expectations and give an overview of  how we 
examine this prediction in the present research.
Interpersonal rejection 
concerns and selective 
attention
While some of  the consequences of  interper-
sonal rejection are likely to vary considerably 
depending on the particular rejection experience 
(e.g., prejudice, peer rejection, social exclusion, 
unrequited love), all interpersonal rejection expe-
riences share a common core: they pose a threat 
to the fundamental goal of  being valued and 
accepted (Smart Richman & Leary, 2009; cf. 
Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Of  particular impor-
tance for the present research, the threat to one’s 
need to belong is not restricted to being rejected 
by highly valued ingroup members. In fact, 
research suggests that the need to belong is 
threatened even when one is being excluded by 
members of  a despised outgroup (Gonsalkorale 
& Williams, 2007; cf. Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 
2000), or by a computer (Zadro, Williams, & 
Richardson, 2004). Therefore, we argue that any 
threat of  interpersonal rejection should raise con-
cerns about how one is evaluated and direct 
attention towards social evaluative information 
(Vorauer, 2006). The most direct support for this 
line of  reasoning can be found in the social exclu-
sion literature (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; 
Gardner, Pickett, Jefferis, & Knowles, 2005; 
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Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). For exam-
ple, experiences with social rejection have been 
found to facilitate memory for social events as 
compared to nonsocial events (Gardner et al., 
2000) and to direct attention to the emotional 
tone of  voice in a vocal version of  the emotional 
Stroop task (Pickett et al., 2004, Study 2).
While concerns about interpersonal rejection 
can direct attention towards social evaluative cues 
in general, more recent studies suggest that indi-
viduals do not allocate equal amounts of  attention 
to all social evaluative cues. DeWall et al. (2009) 
found that social rejection concerns directed 
attention exclusively towards social acceptance 
cues rather than towards social evaluative cues 
more generally. Specifically, a series of  experi-
ments demonstrated that a social exclusion threat 
directed attention towards happy faces (social 
acceptance cues), but not towards faces displaying 
other emotions. Moreover, as outlined above, 
Pickett et al. (2004) found that a social rejection 
experience increased attention to vocal tone in an 
emotional Stroop task. However, this effect was 
driven primarily by trials in which the vocal tone 
was positive rather than negative (Pickett et al., 
2004, Study 2). Thus, while social rejection con-
cerns may direct attention towards social cues in 
general, social acceptance cues appear to receive 
particular attention.
However, as mentioned above, concerns 
about interpersonal rejection do not always lead 
to an affiliative, acceptance-oriented attention 
bias. Expectations of  interpersonal rejection have 
also been found to increase vigilance for signs of  
interpersonal rejection. Specifically, women who 
were led to believe that a future male interaction 
partner held sexist (vs. nonsexist) attitudes 
directed their attention towards prejudice-related 
stimuli in an emotional Stroop task (Kaiser et al., 
2006, Study 2). It should be noted, however, that 
attention to prejudice-related stimuli was only 
compared with attention to nonsocial words (ill-
nesses, household objects). As prejudice-related 
words were the only social stimuli in this study, 
these findings may reflect the more general ten-
dency for rejection concerns to direct attention 
towards social (vs. nonsocial) cues (Gardner et al., 
2000; Pickett et al., 2004). In order to determine 
whether prejudice expectations can lead to vigi-
lance for social rejection cues in particular, addi-
tional research is needed using experimental 
paradigms in which both social acceptance cues 
and social rejection cues are included.
A relevant question then is when expectations 
of  interpersonal rejection initiate selective pro-
cessing of  cues that may help facilitate the inter-
action and improve relations with the interaction 
partner (social acceptance cues), and when they 
may verify expectations of  interpersonal rejec-
tion. In the present research we address this ques-
tion from the perspective of  regulatory focus 
theory (Higgins, 1997). Specifically, we examine 
whether prejudice expectations direct attention 
towards different social stimuli depending on the 
individual’s regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997). 
Below we briefly introduce regulatory focus the-
ory and explain why we expect regulatory focus 
to modulate the effect of  prejudice expectations 
on selective attention.
The role of  regulatory focus
According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 
1997) there are two distinct self-regulatory sys-
tems that guide cognition, emotion, and behavior 
in goal pursuit: the promotion system and the 
prevention system. The two self-regulatory sys-
tems serve different needs and are associated 
with distinct strategic inclinations in goal pursuit. 
When under a promotion focus, individuals are 
concerned with their ideals and nurturance needs. 
This focus is associated with eager approach- 
oriented strategies aimed at reaching a positive 
end-state and a general sensitivity to the presence 
versus absence of  positive outcomes (e.g., Brendl, 
Higgins, & Lemm, 1995; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; 
Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins, 2001; 
Molden & Higgins, 2004). By contrast, when 
under a prevention focus, individuals are con-
cerned with their oughts and safety needs. This 
focus is associated with avoidance-oriented strat-
egies aimed at precluding a negative end-state and 
a general sensitivity to the presence versus absence 
of  negative outcomes (e.g., Brendl et al., 1995; 
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Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Liberman et al., 2001; 
Molden & Higgins, 2004).
In a situation in which prejudice expectations 
are salient—and thereby concerns about how one 
is evaluated (e.g., Vorauer, 2006)—we expect indi-
viduals to formulate different goals and adopt dif-
ferent information-processing strategies depending 
on their current regulatory focus. When under a 
promotion focus, individuals should adopt an 
eager, approach-oriented strategy and initiate a 
selective search for signs of  social acceptance. As a 
result, they should become particularly sensitive to 
the presence (vs. absence) of  social acceptance 
cues. Thus, when prejudice expectations are sali-
ent, cues indicative of  social acceptance (vs. rejec-
tion) should be particularly likely to capture 
attention when the individual is under a promotion 
focus (cf. DeWall et al., 2009).
By contrast, in a situation in which prejudice 
expectations are salient, individuals under a pre-
vention focus should adopt an avoidance-oriented 
strategy and initiate a selective search for signs of  
social rejection. As a result, when under a preven-
tion focus, prejudice expectations should make 
individuals particularly sensitive to the presence 
(vs. absence) of  social rejection cues (cf. Inzlicht 
et al., 2008; Kaiser et al., 2006). Thus, when preju-
dice expectations are salient and the individual is 
under a prevention focus, social rejection (vs. 
acceptance) cues should be particularly likely to 
capture attention.
Overview of  the present research
In two studies we examine the general hypothesis 
that regulatory foci modulate how prejudice expec-
tations affect selective attention. In both studies 
we manipulated prejudice expectations by provid-
ing the female participants with bogus feedback 
suggesting that their male interaction partner 
endorsed sexist (vs. nonsexist) attitudes (Kaiser 
et al., 2006). Across the two studies, we examined 
the role of  regulatory foci in different ways. In 
the first study chronic individual differences in 
promotion focus and prevention focus strength 
were assessed upon arrival in the lab. In Study 2 
we tested our causal claims more rigorously by 
experimentally inducing different regulatory foci.
Across studies, we varied the methodology 
used to measure selective attention. In the first 
study we used a dot-probe task to examine 
whether participants’ directed their attention 
towards a male face signaling social acceptance 
(i.e., happiness; DeWall et al., 2009) versus social 
rejection (i.e., contempt; Fischer & Roseman, 
2007; Inzlicht et al., 2008) when presented 
simultaneously (i.e., competing for their atten-
tion). In Study 2 we examined whether biases in 
attention generalized to acceptance-related (vs. 
prejudice-related) words presented subliminally in 
an emotional Stroop task (cf. Kaiser et al., 2006).
Study 1
Method
Participants and design Female Leiden Uni-
versity students (N = 58) between 18 and 38 years 
of  age (M = 21, SD = 3.28) were randomly 
assigned to the prejudice expected condition or to 
the control condition. A measure of  chronic regu-
latory focus served as an additional independent 
variable. The experiment lasted approximately 30 
minutes, and all participants received €3.00 or 
course credit for their participation.
Procedure Upon arrival in the lab, participants 
were seated behind computers in separate cubi-
cles. Participants were informed that they were to 
participate in two short pilot studies and a main 
study on communication and impression forma-
tion. First, it was announced, they would partici-
pate in the piloting of  a questionnaire. This was 
followed by the assessment of  chronic regulatory 
focus using the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
(Higgins et al., 2001). Promotion focus was meas-
ured with six items (e.g., “I feel like I have made 
progress toward being successful in my life,” α = 
.74), and prevention focus was measured with 
five items (e.g., “How often did you obey rules 
and regulations that were established by your par-
ents?” α = .78). All items were anchored at 1 = rarely 
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to 7 = often or 1 = certainly not true to 7 = certainly 
true.
After that, participants were informed that the 
next study focused on communication between 
strangers, and that they would take part in a dis-
cussion with another participant in the video lab 
across the hall. To manipulate prejudice expecta-
tions, participants were asked to complete a ques-
tionnaire about their attitudes towards four 
different social issues (i.e., financial aid to devel-
oping countries, gender equality, the European 
Union, and sustainable energy). This question-
naire would supposedly be used to introduce 
them to their interaction partner (cf. Kaiser et al., 
2006). Once participants had filled out the ques-
tionnaire, they received the questionnaire that 
was (supposedly) filled out by their interaction 
partner. In both experimental conditions the 
questionnaire suggested that the interaction part-
ner was a 20-year-old male medical student. The 
only difference across conditions was how he 
responded to the four items concerning gender 
equality (Kaiser et al., 2006). In the prejudice 
expectations condition he agreed to a large extent 
with statements such as “I could not work for a 
female boss because women can be overly emo-
tional” and “I don’t think it is good for the well-
being of  children when their mother is working.” 
By contrast, he strongly disagreed with these 
statements in the control condition. Along with 
the completed questionnaire constituting the 
prejudice expectations manipulation, participants 
also received a second short questionnaire in 
which they were asked to indicate to what extent 
they agreed with him on the topics (e.g., “I think 
we agree on the topic of  gender equality”). All 
responses were made on a 7-point scale (0 = we do 
not agree at all, 6 = we agree completely).
It was then stated on the computer screen that, 
before leaving the cubicle to interact with their 
partner, they would participate in the pilot testing 
of  a computerized reaction time task. This was 
followed by the dot-probe task used to measure 
selective attention to acceptance (vs. rejection) 
cues. As stimulus materials we used four photo-
graphs of  male faces displaying happiness (social 
acceptance cue; DeWall et al., 2009) and four pho-
tographs of  the same male faces displaying con-
tempt (social rejection cue; Inzlicht et al., 2008). 
All stimuli were taken from the Amsterdam 
Dynamic Facial Expression Set (ADFES; van der 
Schalk, Hawk, Fischer, & Doosje, 2011).1 The dot-
probe task was introduced as a symbol-identification 
task in which the goal was to identify a symbol 
presented on the screen (“

” vs. “

”). Each trial 
started with the presentation of  a fixation point at 
the center of  the screen (1,500 ms). After that, 
two male faces (5 × 9 cm) were simultaneously 
presented on the screen (200 ms), one face at each 
side of  the fixation point, and thus competing for 
attention. One of  the faces signaled social rejec-
tion (contempt), whereas the other face signaled 
social acceptance (happiness). Immediately after 
that, the symbol to be identified appeared at the 
location where one of  the faces had been pre-
sented. Participants’ were instructed to focus on 
identifying the symbol as quickly and as accurately 
as possible (by means of  a key-press), and to dis-
regard the faces presented. After a short delay 
(1,500 ms) the next trial then followed.
A total of  eight different trials were used in a 2 
(face location: contempt face to the left or happy 
face to the left) × 2 (symbol location: left or right) 
× 2 (symbol:   vs. 

) factorial design. There 
were a total of  96 trials (in random order), with 
each trial type presented 12 times. The computer 
registered the time needed to correctly identify 
the symbols. Faster identification of  symbols pre-
sented at the same location as a contemptuous (vs. 
happy) male face is indicative of  an attention bias 
for social rejection (vs. acceptance) cues (DeWall 
et al., 2009). Before beginning the task, partici-
pants received 10 practice trials with neutral faces.
Finally, as a manipulation check of  prejudice 
expectations we adapted some items from the 
stigma-consciousness scale (Pinel, 1999) (e.g., “I 
expect my interaction partner to interpret my 
behavior differently because I am a woman,” “I 
don’t expect my interaction partner to judge me 
on the basis of  my gender [recoded]”). All seven 
items were answered on a 7-point scale (1 = do not 
agree at all, 7 = agree completely), (α = .79). After 
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that, participants were informed that the discus-
sion would not take place and that the experiment 
was over. All participants were fully debriefed, 
thanked and paid for their participation.
Results
The data was analyzed by means of  regression 
analyses. The prejudice expectations manipula-
tion was effect-coded (1 for prejudice expecta-
tions and −1 for control) and the promotion and 
prevention focus strength variables were centered 
before computing the relevant interaction terms. 
Promotion and prevention focus strength scores 
were perfectly independent (r = 0) and did not dif-
fer between the two experimental groups, Fs < 1. 
All three independent variables (prejudice expec-
tations, promotion focus strength, and prevention 
focus strength) and the interaction terms relevant 
for our hypotheses (prejudice expectations × pro-
motion focus strength, prejudice expectations × 
prevention focus strength) were included in all 
regression analyses.
Prejudice expectations Only the expected 
main effect of  prejudice expectations emerged on 
expectations of  differential treatment, b = .37, SE 
= .15, p = .01. Participants in the prejudice expec-
tations condition expected more differential treat-
ment from the interaction partner as a consequence 
of  their gender (M = 4.02, SD = 1.27) than partici-
pants in the control condition (M = 3.27, SD = 
.84). In addition, only a main effect of  prejudice 
expectations was found on agreement with the 
male interaction partner on the topic of  gender 
equality, b = −1.72, SE = .13, p < .001. Participants 
in the control condition were more in agreement 
with the male interaction partner on the topic of  
gender equality (M = 4.59, SD = 1.18) than partici-
pants in the prejudice expectations condition (M = 
0.86, SD = .89). No differences in agreement were 
found on any of  the other three topics covered in 
the questionnaire. We thus conclude that our 
manipulation was perceived as intended.
Selective attention All response times on tri-
als on which the symbol was correctly identified 
were included in the analyses. An attention bias 
score was calculated for each participant by sub-
tracting the average response time on trials on 
which the symbol appeared at the location of  a 
happy face from the average response time on tri-
als on which the symbol appeared at the location 
of  a contempt face. Thus, a positive score indi-
cates an attention bias (in milliseconds) for happy 
faces (social acceptance cues), whereas a negative 
score is indicative of  an attention bias for con-
tempt faces (social rejection cues).
Overall, participants did not display any atten-
tion bias in favor of  social acceptance or rejection 
cues (M = −6.04, SD = 44.90), t(56) = −1.02, p = 
.32. However, a regression analysis revealed a mar-
ginally significant main effect of  prejudice expec-
tations on the attention bias measure, b = 10.41, 
SE = 5.74, p = .08. The direction of  the effect 
indicated that prejudice expectations (vs. control) 
caused a slight attention bias towards social 
acceptance cues. More importantly, this effect was 
qualified by a significant prejudice expectations by 
promotion focus strength interaction, b = 12.89, 
SE = 5.68, p = .03. This interaction is depicted in 
Figure 1. As predicted, simple slope analyses 
revealed that prejudice expectations directed 
attention towards happy faces among individuals 
with a relatively strong promotion focus (1 SD 
above the mean), b = 23.16, p = .006. By contrast, 
prejudice expectations had no effect on selective 
attention among individuals with a relatively weak 
promotion focus (1 SD below the mean), b = 
−2.64, p = .75. No other effects were obtained on 
the attention bias measure. Of  particular relevance 
for the present purposes, the prejudice expecta-
tions by prevention focus strength interaction did 
not approach significance, b = −5.64, SE = 6.02, p 
= .35. Thus, we found no support for the predic-
tion that prejudice expectations direct attention 
towards rejecting faces among individuals with a 
strong prevention focus. We will return to this 
issue in the discussion.
Discussion
Consistent with research on other forms of  inter-
personal rejection concerns (e.g., DeWall et al., 
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2009), our findings suggest that individuals can 
respond to prejudice expectations by selectively 
attending to social acceptance cues. As predicted, 
however, this effect only emerged among individu-
als with a strong (vs. weak) promotion focus. Thus, 
we have initial evidence that selectively attending 
to acceptance cues in response to prejudice expec-
tations constitutes a promotion-oriented strat-
egy to deal with concerns about how one is 
evaluated. Surprisingly, the strength of  individu-
als’ prevention focus did not affect attention in 
any way. Most relevant for the present purposes, 
we did not find any support for the notion that 
prejudice expectations direct attention towards 
social rejection cues among individuals with a 
strong prevention focus.
How can we explain the lack of  vigilance 
among individuals with a strong prevention focus 
who expected prejudice? Notably, Kaiser et al. 
(2006) argued that individuals who expect preju-
dice screen the environment for prejudice-related 
cues preconsciously. Indeed, these researchers found 
that prejudice expectations directed attention 
towards prejudice-related words when presented 
subliminally, but not when they were presented 
supraliminally. Thus, one possible explanation to 
why we failed to attain evidence for vigilance 
towards rejection cues among individuals with a 
strong prevention focus is that we presented our 
stimuli supraliminally rather than subliminally. In 
Study 2 we therefore examine whether prejudice 
expectations and regulatory focus interactively 
determine whether people preconsciously direct 
their attention to acceptance-related (vs. prejudice-
related) words presented subliminally in an emo-
tional Stroop task (cf. Kaiser et al., 2006).
Second, in this study we relied on chronic indi-
vidual differences in promotion and prevention 
focus strength. As a consequence, we cannot 
conclusively rule out the possibility that our 
results are attributable to some unknown third 
factor rather than to differences in regulatory 
foci. To provide more direct evidence that regula-
tory focus has a causal effect on selective atten-
tion, we manipulated both prejudice expectations 
and regulatory focus in our second study.
Study 2
Participants and design
Female Leiden University students (N = 120) 
between 18 and 46 years of  age (M = 20, SD = 3.37) 
were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (preju-
dice expectations: prejudice expected vs. control) × 2 
(regulatory focus: promotion vs. prevention) facto-
rial design. The experiment lasted approximately 30 
minutes, and all participants received €3.00 or course 
credit for their participation.
Procedure
The cover story, including the prejudice expecta-
tions manipulation, was identical to that in Study 1. 
After the prejudice expectations manipulation, 
participants were asked to participate in two short 
pilot studies prior to meeting up with their inter-
action partner in the video-lab. In reality, the first 
pilot study constituted the regulatory focus manipula-
tion. Following Friedman and Förster (2001), we 
induced different regulatory foci by means of  
two different paper-and-pencil mazes. Participants 
in the promotion focus condition led a mouse 
through a maze in an attempt to attain a piece of  
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Control Prejudice
A
tte
nt
io
n 
bi
as
Low promotion
High promotion
Figure 1. Attention bias as a function of  prejudice 
expectations and promotion focus strength, controlling 
for prevention focus strength. Positive/negative scores 
indicate an attention bias for acceptance/rejection cues 
(Study 1).
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cheese depicted outside the maze. By contrast, 
participants in the prevention focus led a mouse 
through a maze to escape from a predator bird 
depicted above the maze.
This was followed by the second pilot study, 
which in reality was the emotional Stroop task used 
to measure selective attention. Each trial started 
with a fixation cross at the center of  the screen, 
followed by the subliminal presentation of  a prime 
word in red or blue ink (15 ms). The prime word 
was immediately backward masked by a series of  
Xs. The number of  Xs was equal to the number 
of  letters of  the prime word, and presented in the 
same color. The series of  Xs remained on the 
screen until the participant indicated its color 
with a key-press, upon which the next trial began. 
The task contained two blocks of  trials. In each 
block the same 10 primes from each category 
(prejudice-related, acceptance-related, and nonso-
cial) were presented in random order. The prejudice-
related words were the same as those used by Kaiser 
et al. (2006; e.g., sexist, whore, slut), who also 
demonstrated in a pilot study that women per-
ceived these words as threatening. Examples of  
the acceptance-related words used are “friend,” 
“respect,” and “accept,” and examples of  the 
nonsocial words (plants) are “flower,” “rose,” and 
“orchid.” Thus, the task contained a total of  60 
trials. Participants were instructed to indicate the 
color of  the series of  Xs as quickly and as accu-
rately as possible.
After the Stroop task we checked the preju-
dice expectations manipulation with the same 7 
items as in the previous study (α = .83). After 
that, participants were fully debriefed, thanked, 
and paid for their participation.
Results
Prejudice expectations Eight participants 
(two in each condition) were excluded from all 
analyses because they failed to follow instruc-
tions, and therefore were not exposed to the 
experimental manipulations. A 2 (prejudice expec-
tations) × 2 (regulatory focus) ANOVA confirmed 
that participants in the prejudice expectation con-
dition expected more differential treatment from 
the interaction partner as a consequence of  their 
gender (M = 4.36, SD = 1.03) than participants in 
the control condition (M = 3.21, SD = .97), F(1, 
108) = 36.35, p < .001, η2p = .25. No other effects 
approached significance, Fs < 1.
Selective attention (errors) The data from 
two participants were lost due to technical 
problems with the Stroop task. We first exam-
ined selective attention based on how many 
errors participants made when indicating the 
color of  the stimuli. More errors on trials pre-
ceded by an acceptance prime (controlling for 
errors on trials with a nonsocial prime) indi-
cates that more attention is directed to the 
social acceptance prime, while more errors on 
trials preceded by a prejudice prime (controlling 
for trials with a nonsocial prime) indicates that 
more attention is directed to the prejudice 
prime. We tested our predictions with a series 
of  ANCOVAs (cf. Kaiser et al., 2006; Kunda, 
Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002).
We first performed an ANCOVA on the num-
ber of  errors on acceptance prime trials (control-
ling for errors on nonsocial trials). As predicted, 
only the Prejudice Expectations × Regulatory 
Focus interaction emerged, F(1, 105) = 4.19, p = 
.04, η2p = .04. The interaction is depicted in 
Figure 2. Individuals in the promotion focus con-
dition were more distracted (more errors) by 
acceptance primes when they expected prejudice 
(Madj = .85) than in the control condition (Madj 
= .29), F(1, 105) = 5.71, p =.02, η2p =.05. By con-
trast, prejudice expectations had no effect on 
acceptance prime trials among individuals in the 
prevention focus condition (Madj = .58, Madj = 
.68), F < 1. This provides additional support for 
the notion that prejudice expectations direct 
attention towards acceptance cues under a pro-
motion focus, but not under a prevention focus.
An equivalent ANCOVA of  prejudice prime 
trials (controlling for nonsocial prime trials) 
yielded a main effect of  prejudice expectations, 
F(1, 105) = 6.45, p = .01, η2p = .06. Participants 
were less distracted by prejudice-related words 
when they expected prejudice (Madj = .43) than 
in the control condition (Madj = .88). In addition, 
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we also found a marginal main effect of  regula-
tory focus, F(1, 105) = 2.97, p = .09, η2p = .03. 
Participants were less distracted by prejudice-
related words in the prevention focus condition 
(Madj = .51) than in the promotion focus condi-
tion (Madj = .81). The interaction did not approach 
significance, F < 1. Thus, once again, we found 
no support for the hypothesis that individuals 
with a prevention focus respond to prejudice 
expectations by directing their attention towards 
social rejection cues.
Selective attention (response times) We then 
examined selective attention based on response 
times. Only trials on which the color of  the stimuli 
was correctly identified were included in these 
analyses, and responses more than 3 standard devi-
ations from the mean were removed. We tested the 
predictions with a series of  ANCOVAs.
To test whether prejudice expectations directed 
attention towards acceptance cues in the pro-
motion focus condition, we conducted a 2 (prej-
udice expectations) × 2 (regulatory focus) 
ANCOVA on response times to acceptance prime 
trials (controlling for response times on nonsocial 
prime trials). Slower response times on these tri-
als (controlling for response times on trials with a 
nonsocial prime) indicate that more attention is 
directed to the social acceptance prime. Consistent 
with results on Stroop errors, only the predicted 
Prejudice Expectations × Regulatory Focus inter-
action emerged, F(1, 105) = 3.02, p = .08, η2p = 
.03. The interaction is depicted in Figure 3. 
Individuals in the promotion focus condition 
were slightly more distracted by acceptance 
primes when they expected prejudice (Madj = 
374) than in the control condition (Madj = 364), 
F(1, 105) = 2.48, p = .12, η2p = .02. By contrast, 
individuals in the prevention focus condition 
were no more distracted by acceptance primes 
when they expected prejudice (Madj = 363) than 
in the control condition (Madj = 368), F < 1. 
This provides additional support for the notion 
that individuals with a promotion focus direct 
their attention towards acceptance cues when 
they expect prejudice, although we note that the 
simple main effect in the promotion focus condi-
tion did not reach statistical significance.
To test whether prejudice expectations directed 
attention towards rejection cues in the prevention 
focus condition, we conducted an equivalent anal-
ysis on response times on prejudice prime trials 
(controlling for response times on nonsocial 
prime trials). Slower response times on these trials 
(controlling for response times on trials with a 
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Figure 2. Average number of  errors on Stroop trials 
preceded by a social acceptance prime as a function of  
prejudice expectations and regulatory focus, controlling 
for number of  errors on nonsocial trials (Study 2).
356
360
364
368
372
376
Promotion Prevention
R
es
po
ns
e 
tim
e
Prejudice
Control
Figure 3. Average response times on Stroop trials 
preceded by a social acceptance prime as a function of  
prejudice expectations and regulatory focus, controlling 
for response times on nonsocial trials (Study 2).
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nonsocial prime) indicate that more attention is 
directed to the social rejection prime. This analysis 
yielded no significant effects, Fs < 1. Thus, consist-
ent with results on Stroop errors, and with results 
from the first study, we found no support for the 
prediction that individuals respond to prejudice 
expectations by attending to social rejection cues 
when they are in a prevention focus.2
Discussion
Prejudice expectations (vs. control) led to slightly 
slower responses and to a significantly higher 
number of  errors on Stroop trials preceded by an 
acceptance prime in the promotion focus condi-
tion, but not in the prevention focus condition. 
This pattern of  results provides additional sup-
port for our hypothesis that prejudice expecta-
tions direct attention towards social acceptance 
cues under a promotion focus. Notably, because 
regulatory focus was manipulated rather than 
measured in this study, these findings confirm 
that regulatory focus indeed has a causal effect on 
selective attention, and strongly suggest that the 
findings from the previous study were not due to 
some unknown third factor. Furthermore, this 
study demonstrates that the attention bias for 
acceptance cues when under a promotion focus 
emerges regardless of  whether the stimuli are 
presented supraliminally (Study 1) or subliminally 
(Study 2).
Consistent with the first study, no support was 
found for the prediction that prejudice expecta-
tions direct attention towards rejection cues 
among individuals with a prevention focus. Instead, 
there was some suggestive evidence that individu-
als paid less attention to prejudice cues when they 
expected prejudiced treatment (irrespective of  
their regulatory focus), and that they paid less 
attention to prejudice cues when they were pre-
vention focused than when they were promotion 
focused (irrespective of  whether prejudice expec-
tations were salient or not). However, because 
these unexpected main effects were found only in 
Study 2, and only on Stroop errors (not on 
response times), we believe they should be inter-
preted with caution. We will return to the broader 
question of  why prejudice expectations did not 
direct attention towards social rejection cues 
when individuals were in a prevention focus in 
the General Discussion section.
General discussion
We adopted a self-regulation perspective to 
account for why prejudice expectations and other 
interpersonal rejection concerns sometimes lead 
to compensatory behaviors and an attention bias 
for signs of  social acceptance (DeWall et al., 
2009; Pickett et al., 2004; Shelton, 2003; Shelton 
et al., 2005), but in other cases lead to antisocial 
responses and a vigilant attention bias (Inzlicht 
et al., 2008; Kaiser et al., 2006). We proposed that 
these disparate responses can be understood as 
promotion- versus prevention-oriented strategies 
to deal with situations in which concerns about 
how one is evaluated are salient (Vorauer, 2006). 
According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 
1997), individuals with a promotion focus are 
motivated to reach ideal end-states, prefer 
approach-oriented strategies in goal pursuit, and 
are sensitive to the presence or absence of  posi-
tive outcomes. This led us to predict that salient 
prejudice expectations should direct attention 
towards signals of  social acceptance in an attempt 
to facilitate the interaction when the individual is 
under a promotion focus. By contrast, individuals 
with a prevention focus are motivated to avoid 
negative end-states and are sensitive to the pres-
ence or absence of  negative outcomes (Higgins, 
1997). We therefore predicted that salient preju-
dice expectations should direct attention towards 
social rejection cues when the individual is under 
a prevention focus (cf. Kaiser et al., 2006).
Two studies provided convergent evidence 
that regulatory focus indeed moderates how prej-
udice expectations affect selective attention. As 
predicted, prejudice expectations caused an atten-
tion bias in favor of  social acceptance cues under 
a promotion focus. Study 1 showed that prejudice 
expectations (vs. control) caused individuals with 
a strong (vs. weak) chronic promotion focus to 
direct their attention to male faces signaling social 
acceptance (vs. rejection). Study 2 demonstrated 
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that the same pattern of  results emerged when a 
promotion (vs. prevention) focus had been exper-
imentally induced rather than measured, and 
when the acceptance-related stimuli were pre-
sented subliminally rather than supraliminally. 
Taken together, these findings strongly suggest 
that selectively attending to social acceptance 
cues is a promotion-oriented response to con-
cerns about prejudiced treatment.
Meanwhile, prejudice expectations did not 
cause a vigilant attention bias among individuals 
under a prevention focus in any of  the present 
studies. Notably, results were consistent irrespec-
tive of  whether regulatory foci were experimen-
tally induced or treated as chronic individual 
differences, and occurred across two different 
selective attention measures. Across selective atten-
tion measures we also varied the type of  rejection 
stimuli used (contemptuous faces, prejudice-
related words), as well as whether the stimuli were 
presented supraliminally or subliminally. Thus, 
whatever the reason is that prejudice expectations 
did not lead to an attention bias among individu-
als with a prevention focus, it appears to be the 
case across various methodologies.
So what can we make of  the fact that we failed 
to find any evidence of  a vigilant attention bias in 
response to prejudice expectations? First of  all, it 
is important to note that the existing empirical 
evidence of  such a bias is limited. To the best of  
our knowledge, the only studies that have demon-
strated a causal relationship between prejudice 
expectations and attention to social rejection cues 
are the two studies by Kaiser et al. (2006). Notably, 
these studies did not contrast attention directed 
towards prejudice-related words with attention to 
socially diagnostic cues of  a positive valence (i.e., 
acceptance cues). Instead, attention to prejudice-
related words was compared with attention to 
threatening and neutral nonsocial words. These 
control stimuli were highly suitable to rule out 
that the bias was merely driven by negative 
valence. However, recent research has demon-
strated that concerns about social rejection and 
exclusion can direct attention to social cues more 
generally (Gardner et al., 2000; Gardner et al., 
2005; Pickett et al., 2004) and to social acceptance 
cues in particular (DeWall et al., 2009). In light of  
this, it seems plausible that the findings by Kaiser 
et al. may be indicative of  a broader attention bias 
towards socially diagnostic information rather 
than a bias exclusively towards social identity 
threatening information. In short, we suspect 
that our current observations may be less incon-
sistent with the findings by Kaiser et al. than they 
initially appear to be.
Nevertheless, there are still good theoretical 
reasons to suspect that prejudice expectations 
could cause a vigilant attention bias towards social 
rejection cues, and that such a response would be 
orchestrated by the prevention focus. There are 
several possible explanations to why such a pat-
tern did not emerge in the present studies. One 
possibility is that the prejudice expectations manip-
ulation induced a strong prevention focus which 
cancelled out the effect of  chronic prevention 
focus strength (Study 1) as well as the experimen-
tal prevention focus induction (Study 2). While 
this interpretation intuitively seems plausible (cf. 
Oyserman, Uskul, Yoder, Nesse, & Williams, 
2007; Seibt & Förster, 2004), it fails to account 
for our pattern of  results. After all, prejudice 
expectations did not lead to a vigilant attention 
bias across the board. Instead, prejudice expecta-
tions generated a marginally significant attention 
bias towards acceptance cues in our first study—
an effect that was moderated by chronic promo-
tion focus strength (and unrelated to prevention 
focus strength). In a similar vein, prejudice expec-
tations appeared to reduce the amount of  atten-
tion directed towards prejudice-related words in 
the second study, as indicated by fewer errors made 
on trials preceded by a prejudice-related prime. In 
short, while it remains plausible that a prejudice 
expectations manipulation could strengthen par-
ticipants’ prevention focus such an effect cannot 
help account for the present findings.
Another explanation for the elusive vigilant 
attention bias is to be found among the underlying 
principles of  selective attention paradigms and 
some new findings with regard to prevention focus 
and executive control. Selective attention is gener-
ally measured using dual-task paradigms (e.g., dot-
probe tasks, emotional Stroop tasks). That is, while 
534  Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 15(4) 
the participant is working on the focal task (e.g., 
identifying/localizing symbols or identifying the 
color of  stimuli), stimuli that are irrelevant to the 
task at hand, but potentially relevant to other acces-
sible goals, are presented on the screen. Ignoring 
task-irrelevant stimuli requires executive control, 
particularly when those stimuli are relevant to other 
accessible goals (e.g., Engle, 2002). Indeed, most 
selective attention paradigms rely upon this 
assumption: If  the individual has another goal 
accessible (e.g., to reaffiliate with others), stimuli 
related to this goal (e.g., acceptance cues) should 
capture attention even though they are irrelevant 
to the focal task. Thus, attention biases as meas-
ured with dual-task paradigms can be conceptual-
ized as executive control failures attributable to the 
influence of  other accessible goals.
An interesting implication of  this is that atten-
tion biases in dual-task paradigms should be more 
difficult to obtain among individuals with a high 
executive control capacity. After all, individuals 
with a high executive control capacity should be 
better able to ignore information that is irrelevant 
to the focal task. Notably, recent research sug-
gests that individuals with a prevention focus 
respond to identity-threatening situations by 
recruiting additional executive control resources. 
As a consequence, they initially perform better on 
dual-task paradigms when they experience an 
identity threat than in a control condition (Ståhl, 
van Laar, & Ellemers, in press; cf. Koch, Holland, 
& van Knippenberg, 2008). Viewed in this light, it 
is possible that the rejection bias remained elusive 
in the present research because individuals with a 
prevention focus responded to the prejudice 
expectations manipulation by recruiting addi-
tional executive control resources. As a conse-
quence, they may have been able to ignore stimuli 
related to other accessible goals (i.e., the rejection 
cues). This possibility could be examined in 
future research by including a cognitively demand-
ing filler task prior to measuring selective atten-
tion. If  this interpretation is correct, prejudice 
expectations should cause an attention bias for 
social rejection cues once the prevention-oriented 
individuals have exhausted some of  their execu-
tive control resources.
Implications and suggestions 
for future research
The present research adds to a growing literature on 
how a self-regulation perspective can contribute to 
our understanding of  reactions to prejudice expecta-
tions and other forms of  interpersonal rejection 
concerns (e.g., Oyserman et al., 2007; Sassenberg & 
Hansen, 2007; Trawalter & Richeson, 2006). However, 
we are convinced that much more work can be done 
in this area. In a recent review Smart Richman and 
Leary (2009) proposed a set of  plausible moderators 
of  prosocial and antisocial responses to interper-
sonal rejection experiences. Specifically, they argued 
that prosocial (affiliative) responses to rejection con-
cerns should be more likely when the relationship is 
important, when attempts to improve the relation-
ship are expected to be successful, and when no 
alternative ways to satisfy the need to belong are 
available. By contrast, antisocial responses should be 
more likely when alternative ways to satisfy the need 
to belong are available, when the quality of  the 
relationship is unlikely to improve, and when the 
rejection experience is perceived as unfair (Smart 
Richman & Leary, 2009).
From a self-regulation perspective, however, 
the relative influence of  these factors, as well as 
the specific behavior they elicit, should ultimately 
depend on the individual’s regulatory focus. For 
example, previous research has demonstrated 
that positive expectancies generally have a 
stronger motivational impact on behavior when 
under a promotion focus (Shah & Higgins, 1997; 
Zaal, van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). 
This suggests that expectations that the relation-
ship can be improved primarily should initiate 
affiliative responses when under a promotion 
focus. By contrast, experiences with unfair or 
immoral treatment generally have stronger effects 
on negative affect and behavior when under a pre-
vention focus (Oyserman et al., 2007; Sassenberg 
& Hansen, 2007; Zaal, van Laar, Ståhl, Ellemers, 
& Derks, 2011). This suggests that vigilance and 
antisocial responses may be particularly likely 
when the individual is under a prevention focus 
and the interaction partner’s (presumed) negative 
attitudes are perceived as unfair.
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In addition, there is considerable evidence that 
individuals selectively attend to threatening stim-
uli when they are in an anxious emotional state 
(e.g., Downey, Mougios, Ayduk, London, & Shoda, 
2004; Williams, Mathews, & Macleod, 1996; Yiend 
& Mathews, 2001). Notably, anxious emotional 
states emerge under a prevention focus in response 
to losses, whereas nongains lead to feelings of  
dejection under a promotion focus (e.g., Idson, 
Liberman, & Higgins, 2000). Another fruitful ave-
nue for future research may therefore be to exam-
ine whether individuals with a prevention focus 
respond to repeated experiences with interper-
sonal rejection by becoming increasingly socially 
anxious, vigilant for signs of  rejection, and prone 
to engage in antisocial behavior (cf. Oyserman 
et al., 2007; Pinel, 1999).
Finally, there may also be circumstances under 
which prejudice expectations and other interper-
sonal rejection concerns lead to affiliative responses 
when under a prevention focus. Recent research 
has demonstrated that individuals with a preven-
tion focus switch from cautious to risky tactics in 
goal pursuit when risky tactics are perceived as 
necessary in order to escape a negative outcome 
(Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2008; Scholer, 
Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins, 2010). We 
therefore speculate that individuals with a pre-
vention focus may engage in desperate compen-
satory, affiliative attempts when getting along 
with the interaction partner is the only conceiva-
ble way to protect their sense of  belongingness, or 
when the interaction partner’s (presumed) nega-
tive attitudes are perceived as legitimate.
In closing, we have demonstrated in two 
studies—using two different measures of  selec-
tive attention—that individuals can respond to 
prejudice expectations by directing their attention 
towards social acceptance cues. As expected, this 
attention bias was found only when individuals 
were under a promotion focus. It seems plausible 
that the biased information-processing strategies 
adopted in response to prejudice expectations 
when under a promotion focus can contribute to 
more positive experiences when interacting with 
members of  the outgroup (e.g., Shelton, 2003; 
Shelton et al., 2005). As a consequence, it may 
also help preventing negative self-fulfilling proph-
ecies. On the other hand, their attention bias may 
also make promotion-oriented individuals less 
likely to pick up on subtle signs of  prejudice and 
discrimination, and thus fail to address these 
issues. Ultimately, the current findings may 
therefore shed some new light on another—as 
yet unexamined—reason why members of  stig-
matized groups report so few personal experi-
ences with discrimination, despite being aware 
of  prejudice against their group, and despite the 
fact that they frequently expect to be targets of  
discrimination (Crosby, 1984; Taylor, Wright, 
Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990). To the extent 
that they are under a promotion focus, our find-
ings suggest that their attention is likely to be 
directed towards signs of  social acceptance rather 
than towards signs of  social rejection.
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Notes
1. Validation studies have demonstrated that these 
emotional expressions are perceived as intended 
and that people prefer to avoid (vs. approach) the 
individuals on the pictures when they express con-
tempt (vs. happiness; van der Schalk et al., 2011).
2. The attentive reader will have noticed that response 
times are interpreted differently in the emotional 
Stroop task than in the dot-probe task. In the dot-
probe task, a short response time is due to the eye 
gaze already being directed at the location where 
the symbol appears (because the facial stimuli at 
this location captured attention), whereas a long 
response time suggests that the participant’s atten-
tion was directed elsewhere. In the emotional 
Stroop task, by contrast, the stimuli are always pre-
sented at the same location, and the task is to indi-
cate their color. A long response time indicates 
that the individual attended to the content of  the 
prime rather than its color (i.e., distraction), whereas 
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a short response time indicates that the content of  
the prime did not capture the individual’s attention.
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